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The construction of indigenous identity is vital in the New Zealand context of treaty settlements and tensions 
within Maori communities over asset allocation . The Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(DDRIP) is a document that aspires to protect the identity and therefore the human dignity of indigenous 
peoples . Does the Draft fulfil the needs of the most marginalised indigenous people; those separated from 
their group identity and cultural heritage? 
To narrow the scope of enquiry , this paper focuses on Article 8 of the DDRIP, which enables indigenous 
peoples to identify as part of a group indigenous identity. This paper argues to include in Article 8 an 
independent individual indigenous right to determine an indigenous identity that may be a group identity or 
an individual identity. There are significant numbers of indigenous peoples who are clearly disadvantaged 
by the present concentration of group rights in the Draft Declaration , but most particularly they are excluded 
from being able to identify as part of an indigenous group . Until group membership can be achieved (and it 
can, over time) such marginalised indigenous individuals and their already compromised indigenous 
identities are left unprotected when they are arguably most in need of the rights and protections of the Draft 
Declaration. An individual right to determine an indigenous identity that may be independent of the group 
could protect such individuals . Such a right could introduce more indigenous people to the group entity and 
ultimately to the group protections of the Draft Declaration. An amended Article 8 would better reflect the 
contemporary reality for many indigenous people , including Maori . With appropriate limitations , such an 
article can also be a useful tool for indigenous peoples and Courts in resolving conflicts that arises from the 
clash of the individual and collective rights to determine identity . At least such a tool could be devised by 
indigenous peoples and not imposed upon them. 
Ko Whangatauatia te pae maunga 
Ko Kariri Kura te tai mihi tangata 
Ko Ahipara kamehameha te marae 
Ko Te Ohili te Turangawaewae 
Ko te Rarawa te iwi 
Ko Ngati Moetonga raua ko Te Rokeka nga hapu 
Tihewa mauriora! 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Article 8 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DDRIP) includes 
the important individual and collective rights to self-identification.1 This article, due to the 
use of the word "peoples" and when read in context, appears to enable indigenous groups 
and individuals only to maintain and develop group identities. The individual right spoken 
of in this Article appears to be the right to identify as part of an indigenous people. 
However, many indigenous individuals are excluded from the indigenous groups. This 
paper will demonstrate that group entities and group rights are unable to protect many 
indigenous individuals who are not part of a functioning group. This paper will 
specifically argue that Article 8 should be amended to better enable indigenous individuals 
as well as indigenous peoples to have the right to determine indigenous identity. The 
individual right already present in Article 8 must be expanded to enable indigenous 
individuals to determine an indigenous identity that may not be a recognisably 'group' 
identity. I have named this expanded right an 'independent' individual right to determine 
indigenous identity. By amending Article 8 to include an expanded 'independent' 
individual right ensures that the person holding such a right is not bound to exercise it only 
in the context of group identity. 
Such an independent individual right to determine indigenous identity could be vitally 
important to introduce more indigenous peoples to the full protections of the Draft 
Declaration, including the group rights. The individual decision to determine their own 
indigenous identity is the first step for many to re-integrate into indigenous cultures. After 
a period of time, such reintegrated individuals can also claim group identity and the group 
right to determine indigenous identity and other group rights. This reintegration can be 
demonstrated within the contemporary New Zealand experience. 
Any Article 8 individual right, expanded or not, to determine indigenous identity can 
conflict with the group right to determine that indigenous identity. In Canada the Canadian 
Federal Courts have so far resolved such conflict bluntly by over-riding indigenous 
customary and contemporary practices with an analysis based on individual rights 
contained within the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. Such conflict can, 
' Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right to maintain and develop their distinct identities and characteristics. including the 
right to identify themselves as indigenous and to be recognized as such. 
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however, be resolved within the terms of an amended Article 8 of the DDRIP. Indigenous 
individuals must be allowed to determine indigenous identity alongside the indigenous 
group. Individuals would still need to have recognition from and dialogue with groups to 
establish their indigenous group identity. Such groups can be said to be under a duty to 
recognise indigenous individuals who can be incorporated into the group. Indigenous 
individuals who may not be members of a functioning group identity can also establish an 
individual indigenous identity. To do so they must pass the test of recognition by 
significant others in their lives. Claiming such individual indigenous identity can 
eventually lead to these individuals also being able to claim an indigenous group identity. 
A Structure 
Section II of this paper identifies particularly influential definitions of indigenous peoples 
that inform the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. These 
definitions tend to emphasise indigenous peoples as group entities; a tendency that may 
actually exclude large numbers of indigenous individuals from rights protection. The 
somewhat ambiguous wording of the Draft Declaration itself enhances this perception. 
This section will then look at the theoretical concept of group rights, showing the 
dynamism of groups and the difficulties of identifying groups for rights-bearing purposes. 
Section III demonstrates the difficulty of applying group rights to the Maori community in 
New Zealand. Identifying the Maori group in law has proved difficult as the High Court 
decision of Te Waka Hz lka o Te Arawa v Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission has 
shown in its definition of the term ' iwi ' .2 Paradoxically the legal definitions of ' iwi ' 
differs from the Court of Appeal ' s definition of an 'ethnic group ' in King-Ansell v. Police.3 
The formation of the traditional and the contemporary group in Maori society further 
illustrates the complexity of ascertaining those to whom group rights might accrue. 
Furthermore the contemporary assumption that Maori are primarily a collective people 
does not stand up to scrutiny, and individualism is indeed strong in the Maori community. 
As a result , the notion of the group and group rights simply excludes many Maori 
individuals on the edges of the Maori community. 
' [2000] 1 'ZLR 285 
' [ 1979 ] 2 NZLR 53 1 
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In view of the inadequate coverage of group rights Section IV argues for the redrafting of 
Article 8 to include an independent individual right to determine either group or individual 
indigenous identity. This individual right could become a necessary trigger, which will 
eventually enable the individual to claim genuine group membership and be eligible for the 
group protections hitherto unavailable to significant numbers of marginalised indigenous 
individuals. Inevitably groups and individuals will conflict over who should be recognised 
as indigenous and who should not. The group right to determine its own identity is limited 
to a certain extent. Concomitant with that group right must be a group duty for the 
members of an indigenous community to include, protect and respect all eligible individual 
members . This independent individual right to determine indigenous identity also needs to 
be limited and defined and requires recognition by other indigenous individuals or groups. 
A line will have to be drawn in the sand as to who may called indigenous and qualify for 
the right and who may not. This paper tentatively suggests that the test for whether an 
individual can assert a independent individual right to determine a particular indigenous 
identity depends on the recognition afforded that individual by significant others, some of 
who also hold that indigenous identity . That test must be an open one , in the sense that 
recognition itself need have no compulsory boxes to tick, such as blood quantum or 
specific genealogy. The limitations that can be read into the collective and independent 
individual rights to determine indigenous identity in an amended Article 8 of the Draft 
Declaration may enable some resolution of potential conflict between those rights. 
II INDIGENOUS IDENTITY AND THE PROBLEMS OF GROUP RIGHTS 
The Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is a comprehensive aspirational 
statement of indigenous rights. The DDRIP seeks to protect indigenous peoples because 
all people are entitled to human dignity. As stated in the Preamble to the document, the 
colonisation and the dispossession of lands territories and heritage demonstrate that 
indigenous peoples have not received equal acknowledgement of their human dignity and 
the human rights to which they are entitled merely by virtue of their humanity . Indigenous 
peoples are also sui generis , unique to themselves.4 In order to have the full measure of 
human dignity and human rights indigenous peoples need the protection of their unique 
' Davis. K "Self Determination and Constitutional Change" (2000) 9 Auck ULR 235. 240 
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identity. Protection of that indigenous identity necessarily entails protection and 
development of the indigenous social, political and cultural structures, histories and values. 
The right to identify as indigenous is therefore supremely important because it would allow 
access to the protections of indigenous rights. Article 8 of the DDRIP is vital because it 
includes the individual and collective rights to identify as being part of an indigenous 
people. Indigenous rights discourse, including this article, focuses on the presumed 
collectivity of indigenous peoples and seems to assume that group rights would best serve 
all indigenous people. Some of the more commonly used definitions of indigenous people 
emphasise collectivity as a primary criterion of indigenous identity. This paper argues that 
an independent individual right to determine a group or individual indigenous identity 
exists to enable indigenous individuals unaffiliated to indigenous groups also to be 
included in indigenous rights discourse. Those isolated indigenous individuals have lost so 
much of their indigenous identity and are therefore arguably most in need of the Draft 
Declaration. They too need the acknowledgement of their human dignity as indigenous 
people. 
This section will identify the definitions most commonly used in discussions around the 
Draft Declaration. Once such definitions are explored, the concept of group rights and its 
possible application to indigenous groups must be investigated. There are difficulties in 
tying down the organism to which group rights can be applied. The group changes 
constitution, unlike the individual. There is also considerable argument between scholars 
about whether group rights even exist, or whether group rights are merely individual rights 
writ large. As will be shown, groups are units capable of bearing rights, but the concept of 
group rights proves inadequate for extending the fullest possible right protection to many 
contemporary indigenous people. 
A Definitions And The Draft Declaration On The Rights Of Indigenous Rights. 
In the Final Report: Study on the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous 
Populations Jose Martinez Cobo defined indigenous people in phrases often used as a 
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'working definition' by other rights commentators.5 Coho's definition can be broken down 
to reveal its underlying assumptions about the nature of indigenous populations.6 
.. Indigenous peoples" and nations are those which, having a historical continuity 
with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, 
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in 
those territories , or parts of them. 
This excerpt from Coho' s definition makes a number of assumptions. Use of the term 
'peoples' in this opening sentence implies a level of cohesion or 'groupness' among 
members of an indigenous population. Furthermore, this excerpt also assumes level of 
cultural self-awareness among descendants of indigenous peoples as well as the existence 
of a common self-identification. 
Another component of this part of Cobo' s definition is that indigenous people are assumed 
to have historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial cultures. For people such 
as the Metis , the mixed blood population of Western Canada, their distinctive, self-
identified group identity did not eventuate until after contact with Europeans. The Metis 
insist on retaining and maintaining their unique mixed indigenous identity, including their 
language and culture . Arguably they would not be covered by Coho's definition.7 Much of 
the debate in New Zealand centres on the needs of urban Maori and mirrors similar 
concerns . Some Maori have lost ties with their traditional tribal connections, and often can 
only express identity in pan-Maori, mixed-heritage terms within urban marae facilities 
such as Victoria University 's Te Herenga Waka. For such Maori historical continuity with 
identifiable pre-colonial Maori remains true only at a generalised level abstracted from 
every-day life. Cobo's definition continues: 
They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to 
preserve , develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories and 
their ethnic identity. as the basis of their continued existence as peoples , m 
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems. 
The assumption here that indigenous peoples must only be non-dominant is problematic. 
The term indigenous itself does not imply any state of subordination at all, only the fact 
' Sec for example Alison Quentin-Baxter "The UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Ind igenous Peoples - the international and constitutional 
law contexts ." (1999) VUWLR 29 I 85 
• In Erica-Irene Daes ''Some Considerations on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination· ( 1993) 3 Transnat'l L. & Contcmp. 
Probs. 1. 4 
- Sec Larry Chartand "Arc We Metis or arc we Indians? A Commentary on R v Grumbo" (2000) 31 2 Ottawa L Rev 267. 269 
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that the population belongs to a particular territory and is not foreign to it. The phrase 
'non-dominant' is ill defined and does not automatically apply to populations such as 
indigenous Fijians, for example, although the phrase may apply in certain indices. 
In this second excerpt, a certain coherence of thought and action between members of 
indigenous populations may also be assumed. There is an implied commonality of 
experience and cultural practice. The 'ethnic identity' spoken of presupposes a whole set 
of actions, rituals, beliefs, language use and worldview that make up such an identity. The 
patterns, institutions and systems mentioned presuppose that, for indigenous peoples to be 
included in the definition, they must be able to demonstrate adherence to and 
understanding of those things. In short, Cobo's whole definition assumes collectivity of 
indigenous identity and experience. Exceptions to that definition can be easily found. 
As noted by Debeljak, another current definition is the Working Group on the Draft 
Declaration's (WGDD) own statement that indigenous peoples are 'the descendents of the 
original inhabitants of conquered territories possessing a minority culture and recognising 
themselves as such.' 8 This definition also describes certain collective, group behaviours 
among people with a specific sense of ethnic or cultural identity. 
Despite the use and prevalence of these definitions, the Draft Declaration itself includes no 
definition of indigenous people. Many indigenous representatives to the WGDD recognise 
that defining indigenous peoples automatically excludes those to whom the current 
definitions cannot apply .9 These representatives reject the notion of definition on the 
grounds that any definition would 'violate their right to self-determination; that is, the right 
of indigenous peoples to identify themselves.' 10 However, despite the exclusion of a 
definition within the Draft Declaration, a closer look at the provisions of the Draft reveal 
the strong influence of the definitions and assumptions that have already been discussed. 
1. Assumptions in the Draft Declaration 
According to submissions made by indigenous representatives to the WGDD's report on 
the sixth session, the concept of 'peoples' is fundamental to interpreting the Draft 
• Dcbcljak Julie "Barriers to the Recognition of Indigenous Peoples ' Human Rights at the United Nations' (2000) 26 Monash ULR 182 
• This difficulty was discussed by Tracy Whare reporting on her experience working with the Working Group of the Draft Declaration of the 
Rights of lndigenous Peoples. Any anempt to define indigenous peoples for the purpose of inclusion within the scope of the draft declaration will 
cut out some people. causing controversy. 
'
0 Dcbcljak. Julie ' Barriers to the Recogn ition of Indigenous Peoples· Human Rights at the United Nations' (2000) 26 Monash ULR 159. 183 
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Declaration. 11 As stated by indigenous representatives: 'It would be discriminatory, 
illogical and unscientific to identify us in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples as anything less than peoples.i12 The WGDD reported on the ongoing 
conflict between states and indigenous people over this issue. 13 
Some states can accept the use of the term "indigenous peoples". Other states cannot 
... in part because of the implications this term may have in international law with 
respect to self-determination and individual and collective rights. Some delegations 
have suggested other terms . .. such as "indigenous individuals" , "persons belonging 
to an indigenous group", "indigenous populations" "individuals _in community with 
others" or "persons belonging to indigenous peoples" ... 
Indigenous peoples have so far rejected suggestions by states to interpolate the term 
' individuals ' in the Draft Declaration. Ratification remains in a state of apparent 
'indefinite stalemate' .14 
The Draft does include some rights that extend to individuals. Aside from the 
aforementioned Article 8, other such rights include the Article 1 right to enjoyment of all 
human rights, the Article 2 right to be free from adverse discrimination, the Article 5 right 
to a nationality and the Article 7 right not to be subject to ethnocide or genocide.15 Most of 
the individual rights in the Draft Declaration are also granted specifically to collectives as 
well, as in Article 7. There does however, appear to be some inconsistency in the drafting 
of the Draft Declaration in regard to the use of the term 'peoples' and 'individuals'. In 
some articles indigenous individuals are explicitly identified as being distinct from 
indigenous peoples. This distinction occurs in Articles 2, 9, 11 and 18. Article 2 states: 
Indigenous individuals and peoples are free and equal to all other individuals and 
peoples in dignity and rights , and have the right to be free from any kind of adverse 
discrimination, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity. 
The explicit reference to individuals in some articles, as well as the indigenous 
determination to retain the primacy of the term 'peoples' in the Draft supports an 
assumption that remaining articles that do not explicitly refer to individuals are to refer 
11 Sec also Davis . K .. Self Determination and Constitutional Change" (2000) 9 Auck ULR 235. 242 
12 Proposals by Indigenous Representatives to the WGDD during the sixth session (20 November to I December 2000) 
E/CN.4/2000/WG.!5/CRP.4 page 6 
13 Recommendation by Government groups to the WGDD during the Sixth session (20 November to I December 2000) 
E/CN .4/2000/WG.15/CRP.4 page 2 
" Term used in the Report of the WGDD during the sixth session (20 November to I December 2000) E/CN.4/2000/WG . 15/CRP.4. 2 
" Other specifically individual rights granted within the Draft Declaration include Article s·s right to identify oneself as indigenous: the Article 9 
right to belong to an indigenous community in accordance with traditions and customs of that community and Article I8 's right not to be 
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only to 'peoples'. Of 45 provisions, 32 are directed at 'peoples'. However, interpretation 
of term 'peoples' can be a little ambiguous. Article 1, for example, refers to all 'peoples' 
having full enjoyment of the rights in the UNDHR. These rights are individual rights that 
presumably apply to individuals within 'peoples'. Yet some of the other articles that refer 
to 'peoples' appear to define individual and collective rights accruing only to peoples.16 
Article 8 is an example of this. 
Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right to maintain and develop 
their distinct identities and characteristics, including the right to identify themselves 
as indigenous and to be recognized as such. 
As the primary actors in this sentence are 'indigenous peoples' it appears that the 'distinct 
identities' referred to are group identities, although these rights may be asserted on a 
collective and individual basis. An individual indigenous identity that is not connected to a 
functioning group does not appear to be recognised within this article. Furthermore, as 
will be discussed in Section IV, the individual right that does exist in Article 8 may also be 
in danger of losing recognition due to the emphasis placed on collective rights and 
collective identities strongly present in the Draft Declaration. 
The text of the Draft Declaration itself largely assumes that indigenous people function 
within discrete, culturally aware groups. This assumption can also be seen in Article 12 
that grants indigenous peoples the 'right to practice and revitalise their cultural traditions 
and customs.' Similarly, Article 13 grants the right to 'manifest, practice, develop and 
teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies.' Article 21 grants the 
right to 'maintain and develop their political, economic and social systems, to be secure in 
the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development.' Other articles speak 
of the 'distinctive spiritual and material relationship with lands, territories, waters and 
coastal seas' or to 'own, develop, control and use the lands and territories ... which they 
have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. 17 These articles assume a 
commonality of experience and intent that is expressed within group dynamics. In short, 
the assumptions underlying the Draft Definition about the nature of indigenous people are 
the same as those underlying the definitions discussed a little earlier. Even though there is 
discriminated against in maners of labour. Article 32 grants the right to determine membership and structure of their institutions. Article 42 
guarantees that all rights in the Draft Declaration are guaranteed equally to male and female individuals . 
16 Article 6 applies to ·peoples· and includes the collective right to live in freedom. peace and security as distinct peoples and the individual right 
to life. physical and mental integrity. liberty and security of persoh. Article 7 applies to 'peoples' and includes 'the collective and individual right 
not to be subjected to cthnocidc and cultural genocide '. 
,. Article 25 and 26. 
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no official definition of indigenous people in the Draft, the Draft Declaration applies to 
functioning groups with common culture and common experience who are dominated 
within their territories by other populations. Notwithstanding the concerns of the 
indigenous representatives to avoid defining indigenous peoples in the Draft Declaration, 
Cobo' s definition appears to have been incorporated de facto if not de jure. 
In the Draft Declaration there is understanding that indigenous culture and group identity 
are often severely threatened. This acknowledgement is present in the rights of 
self-determination as well as the rights to revitalisation and development of cultural , 
spiritual and social practices.18 This acknowledgement does not, however , necessarily 
amount to any acknowledgement that some indigenous people may not hold functional 
group identity and share common experience and culture with other descendants of a given 
indigenous population. 
1. Assumptions in Other International Organs 
The assumption that indigenous peoples must exhibit cultural distinctiveness and group 
identity is also present in other international organs. Article 1 of Convention 169, the 
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries states 
that the Convention applies to: 
tribal people in independent countries whose social , cultural and economic 
conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and 
whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by 
special laws and regulations . 
In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , a similar assumption exists ,
19 
even as minority status is protected. Article 27 grants a right ' in community ' and states 
that: 
In those states where ethnic , religious or linguistic minonties exist , persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right , in community with the 
other members of their group , to enjoy their own culture , to profess and practice 
their own religion , or to use their own language. 
" Sec. for example. Aniclcs 3. 12. 13 and 14 
" Sec also The Mataarua Declaration on Cultural and lntellccrual Propcny Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1993. 
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The notion of indigenous rights seems to rely on the existence of a fully functioning, even 
if disadvantaged group. As will soon be shown, the general application of indigenous 
rights is particularly problematic for many individuals most in need of those rights in the 
Draft Declaration mentioned earlier. The assumptions that indigenous peoples operate as 
coherent and culturally self-aware groups adds strength to any argument that such groups 
should be and are eligible for the application of group rights. However, as will be shown 
in the next section, the concept of group or collective rights is very difficult to define, 
apply and demonstrate. The actual operation of group rights potentially excludes many 
indigenous people. 
B Pinning Down The Idea Of Collective Rights 
The concept of collective rights is notoriously slippery to define. In part, this difficulty is 
due to the fact that discussion of such collective rights is often phrased in terms of their 
relationship to the idea of individual rights. Collective rights are often seen to be 
dangerous and antagonistic to the existence of individual rights, such as those expressed 
within the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.2° Discussion of 
collective rights is more rarely undertaken for its own sake. 
2. Identifying the group 
Perhaps the first step to defining collective rights is to define the nature of the group, then 
to investigate whether such a group would be entitled to collective rights. Many different 
types of associations bind human beings. Some associations may be described merely as 
aggregations or sets, for example the aggregation of all left handed people, or six foot tall 
men.21 These are associations by virtue of stable characteristics, but it is unlikely that such 
groupings have a distinct culture whereby individuals feel normatively bound to each other 
beyond a certain commonality of experience. It is this normative bonding, or, according to 
Michael McDonald, an internal sense of recognition that underpins a collective identity. 
20 Darlene M Johnston "Native rights as collective rights: a question of group self-preservation .. (1989) 2. 1 CJLT 19. 20 
21 Narvcson Jan . Collective Rights? (1991) 4. 2 CJLT 330 Darlene M Johnston ''Native rights as collective rights: a question of group self-
prcscrvation" (1989) 2. 1 
CJLT 19, 22 
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He also distinguishes the nature of collectivities by the voluntary or involuntary nature of 
membership. 22 
There is then, a tendency of each group member to see herself as part of an us rather 
than just a separate me ... [A]llegiance to an identifying group structures personal 
identity; it indicates who I am ... the most profound sorts of self-identification are 
non-voluntary and not a matter of choosing to identify with some group or other. 
According to McDonald associations based on will are essentially artificial and include 
teams, political parties and the like. In comparison, associations that are 'natural' will 
include families and communities, including ethnic groups such as native tribes.
23 These 
types of groupings are not based on choice and are more important, being 'more basic or 
deeper' than voluntary associations.24 
3. Not all groups can hold rights 
Even supposing that a group or collective can be satisfactorily identified, the next question 
would be to determine if such a group could be entitled to hold group rights. The problem 
is that group rights presumably do not apply to all groups, whereas the assumption within 
human rights discourse is that individual rights apply to all, provided the rights of others 
are not infringed upon.25 One interpretation of the 'rights idea' is that rights exist to afford 
protection to those who have corresponding 'needs' that 'ought' to be met in order of 
urgency.26 Certain groups are not in urgent need of protection of their group identities. 
Even within the subset of indigenous groups, some groups do not need urgent protection to 
the same extent as others indigenous groups.27
 How is it possible to determine which 
groups are eligible for group rights and which are not? 
4. Groups are dynamic 
According to Clinton, indigenous rights and responsibility 'exist only within the 
framework of ... familial, social and tribal networks.' 28 In addition, some commentators 
"McDonald. Michael '"Should communities have rights? Reflections on liberal individualism:· (1991) 4 . 2 CJL T 217 
~' In Darlene M Johnston "Native rights as collective rights: a question of group self-preservation· (1989) 2. I CJLT 19. 31 
"' In Darlene M Johnston ·Native rights as collective rights: a question of group self-preservation' ( 1989) 2. 1 CJL T 19. 23 
15 Narveson Jan. Collective Right<? (1991) 4. 2 CJLT 330 
'' Ramon Daz. lecture March 262001. Laws 520 Human Rights Seminar Serie 
r Fact Sheet No 9 (Rev 1) The Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 1995) 2 
" Clinton Robert N 'The rights of indigenous peoples as collective group rights· 32. 4 ( 1990) Ariz L Rev 742 
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maintain that 'without land, native existence 1s deprived of its coherence and 
distinctiveness.' 29 Pentney asserts that collective rights are meaningless without the 
continued existence and vitality of the group.30 Without land, according to this thought, 
there can be no group identity. This view of group identity depends on the maintenance of 
a certain static cultural identity and possession of resources.31 
This understanding of indigenous identity does not acknowledge that groups are dynamic 
and at one time in their history may be in need of protection, yet another time of their 
history may not be in need of protection. How do we decide when a group warrants, or 
does not warrant protection for its identity? For many indigenous people who are landless, 
or on the point of becoming so, their group identity is precarious, and for some, possibly 
non-existent. It is at that very point of dispossession that the idea of collective rights, as a 
protective mechanism within the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, is 
at its strongest. Yet, are such dis-integrated people even eligible for the protection as a 
group? Erica-Irene Daes, Chairperson-Rapporteur of the United Nation's Working Group 
on Indigenous Populations, apparently recognises this difficulty for modern indigenous 
populations. She has stated that at issue is not the differences or similarities between 
indigenous and non-indigenous populations today, but 'the fact that two peoples have had, 
for millennia, separate histories which touched each other very little or not at all.' 32 
Perhaps on this observation, the objective genealogical link between an individual and that 
separate history would be all that is required to qualify for membership of a collective.33 
Presumably a group that is presently stable and in less need of protection might need such 
protection at some later point. As the social, political and economic environment of the 
group changes, what happens to the nature of the rights that can accrue to it? Isaac states 
that individual rights and group rights need be triggered only when those rights are 
threatened.34 However, there is no point in Western discourse at which an individual can 
be redefined as no longer being an individual for the purpose of claiming individual rights. 
It is conceivable to many commentators that groups may lose their group identity and 
29 Darlene M Johnston "Native rights as collective rights: a question of group self-preservation" (1989) 2. I CJL T I 9. 32 
30 In Darlene M Johnston "Native rights as collective rights: a question of group self-preservation" ( 1989) 2. I CJL T 19. 28 
31 Debeljak recognises the difficulties of assuming a static cultural understanding and suggests that definition of indigenous peoples should only 
be undertaken by indigenous peoples . Julie Dcbeljak "Barriers to the Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights at the United Nations" 
(2000) 26 Monash ULR 159, 181 However . as can be shown in the second part of this essay. indigenous peoples themselves contribute to such 
understandings of indigenous culture. 
32 Erica-Irene Daes "'Some Considerations on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination" ( 1993) 3 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs 
1. 6 
" As will be demonstrated later. this is the view that has been followed in New Zealand case law in the definition of iwi. This debate arises in the 
context of determining the rights of Urban Maori to be recognised as a collective for the purposes of the allocation of fishing assets. 
"Thomas Isaac "Individual versus collective rights: aboriginal people and the significance of Thomas v. Norris" 21. 3 ( 1992) Man LJ 626 
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therefore group rights, depending on observable criteria such as cultural practice, 
distinctiveness and land ownership. 
C Conclusion 
Group rights are difficult to identify and quantify, and it appears that within the context of 
indigenous rights a confusing discourse is emerging that challenges usual definitions of 
what may qualify to be called a group. On the one hand, there is a certain insistence that 
indigenous identity is immutable and connected to strong notions of collectivity. On the 
other hand, the externally imposed definition of an indigenous group would have to be 
stretched wider and wider to accommodate modem indigenous experience. This can be 
demonstrated by the aforementioned comments from the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the 
Working Group on the DDRIP, Erica Irene-Daes. 
The definitions and rights discussed in the Draft Declaration and in other instruments that 
emphasise collectivity concentrate on similarities of experience between indigenous 
groups. In fact, as discussed by Maori rights theorist Maurice Ormsby, the Draft 
Declaration is intended to be 'a normative instrument' .35 This concentration on normative 
standards for the conceptualisation of indigenous people perhaps feeds into the creation of 
a 'grand narrative' of indigenous experience and identity that attempts to place indigenous 
people once more at the centre of discourse about their lives and histories.36 Such 
standardisation of contemporary indigenous experience, as expressed in the Draft 
Declaration and elsewhere, does not acknowledge that many descendents of indigenous 
populations may not demonstrate cultural membership of the indigenous group or may 
have little or no access to participation in indigenous group identity. However, these 
descendants are increasingly likely, in countries such as Canada and New Zealand, to 
participate in cultural resurgence in order to activate and access cultural and group 
membership. Discussions of indigenous peoples and indigenous rights have not so far 
adequately reflected these peoples' experiences and the complexity of contemporary 
indigenous life. The indigenous people most marginalised and colonised by their histories 
and experiences are the ones who have lost their language, their cultural history and their 
full and active membership of the indigenous group identity. They are the people most 
" M J Ormsby 'Individual and Collective Rights' (Unpublished paper prepared for the Ministry of Justice. 1997) 4 7. 
36 See also Adeno Addis 'Individualism. Communitarianism and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities' 66. 1219 (1991) Notre Dame L Rev 615. 649 
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excluded by current definitions and most in need of the protections offered by the Draft 
Declaration and the attendant discourse. Section III will examine some of the concepts so 
far discussed and demonstrate their application with reference to traditional and 
contemporary Maori in New Zealand. 
III MAORI COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 
The slipperiness of collective rights theory as discussed in Section II can be demonstrated 
by the Maori experience(s) in New Zealand. Much contemporary comment about Maori 
society tends to treat Maori traditional society and Maori contemporary society as a 
seamless whole. Maori culture is often described in terms of a traditional, collective past. 
This tendency creates an ideological discourse that ignores political and social reality that 
may ultimately undermine Maori aspirations to achieve recognition of indigenous rights. 
The High Court decision of Te Waka Hz Ika o Te Arawa v Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries 
Commission has attempted to distil the actual history and status of Maori in New Zealand 
today to come up with a definition of the term 'iwi' .
37 As will be demonstrated, this 
definition bears little resemblance to the Court of Appeal's definition of an 'ethnic group' 
in the leading case on the matter; King-Ansell v. Police.
38 Furthermore, this definition 
necessarily undermines traditional criteria of the primary functional Maori group: the hapu. 
Traditional Maori notions of functioning group identity include hapu and other larger, less 
permanent group structures as iwi. With the arrival of Pak:eha to New Zealand and 
subsequent colonisation, the notion of Maori as a racial and cultural group separate to 
Pak:eha arose. The Treaty of Waitangi has secured some collective rights for iwi and hapu 
under Article Two. Contemporary life, for many Maori however directly erodes traditional 
functioning groups, calling into question the appropriate application of group rights. 
A Identifying The Group 
In New Zealand, the legal definition of ethnic group identity is rare. One example is the 
term 'ethnic origins' contained within the Human Rights Act 1993.
39 Other grounds for 
discrimination under the Act including sex, marital status, age and sexual orientation can 
,-12000] I NZLR 285 
" [ 1979] 2 ZLR 531 
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be defined without reference to others who fall into the same aggregate. In contrast, 
'ethnic origins' as discussed by Schnackenberg, 'cannot be fully encapsulated within one 
person.'40 The 1979 Court of Appeal case King-Ansell v. Police remains the leading 
authority in New Zealand case-law in defining an ethnic group.
41 This case examined 
whether the 1971 Race Relations Act's use of the terms 'ethnic' and 'group' could be used 
to describe the New Zealand Jewish community.
42 Woodhouse and Richardson JJ adhered 
to definitions that included the ethnic group's subjective idea of its own identity as well as 
objective elements, such as the opinions of others outside the relevant group.
43 
... the test for contemporary purposes would be a subjective belief by the members of 
the group of being alike by reason of accepting and sharing the kind of 
characteristics already mentioned and of feeling different on that ground; together 
with objective opinion of others that they should be so regarded ... I think the issue 
will be answered by the strength of the ancestral ties, whether real or assumed, and 
the traditional and cultural values and beliefs that have been handed down and are 
.. . adhered to by all. (Emphasis added) 
When this definition is added to McDonald's idea that the more morally important a group 
is, the more involuntary its constitution, there seems to be an assumption that group 
identity is static and homogeneous in behaviour and self-regard. 
It could be argued that these assumptions fail to take into account the idea that group 
identity or culture can be learned and unlearned . What, for example, happens to children 
of intermarriage between definable cultural groups? Woodhouse J's 'objective opinion of 
others' would perhaps ignore such children who don't look like members of one or other of 
the groups, or who do not share certain behaviours with members of that group. However, 
as will be discussed in Section IV the recognition of others is indeed important for defining 
who is and who is not an indigenous person, entitled to hold indigenous rights. It must be 
acknowledged, however, that Woodhouse J, by use of the term 'objective' implies that any 
reasonable member of an ethnic group would recognise other members of the group. 
Colonial history however tells us that there are many occasions where individuals who are 
the progeny of mixed marriages may well not be recognised objectively as members of 
either one or both of the cultures of their parents. 
" Human Rights Act 1992 s2l(d} 
'° Sec Carl Schnackenberg 'Ethnic Origin Discrimination: A Place for lwi in the Human Rights Act? 8. 14 (1999) Auck ULR 1213 
" [ 1979) 2 NZLR 531 
., The Race Relations Act 1971 is the predecessor to the Human Rights Act 1993 
" [1979) 2 NZLR 531. 538-539 
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These definitions of groupness may not acknowledge the fact that it is also quite possible 
for the children of such relationships to elect to activate their memberships of a specific 
grouping in deliberate pursuit of McDonald's aforementioned 'internal sense of 
recognition.' In that sense then, such members do act voluntarily. If the membership of 
those who elect to pursue their membership can be defined as voluntary (and this is still 
problematic), are they then entitled to group rights that they can theoretically opt out of?
44 
Certainly, an expanded view of group membership is reflected in the decision of the New 
Zealand High Court in Te Waka Hi Ika o Te Arawa v. Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries 
Commission.45 Called upon to determine whether the word 'iwi' applied only to traditional 
Maori tribes or could also be used to apply to Urban Maori Authorities, the Court replied 
that only traditional Maori tribes could claim the term iwi (per Paterson, J). However, the 
Court proffered a definition of iwi that takes into account the changes wrought by 
colonisation and other massive social pressures.46 
Thus a "traditional tribe" comprises those Maori people who claim descent from a 
named common ancestor and whose ancestors were at some time in the past 
recognised as living in a particular tribal area ... the traditional tribe must have been 
recognised as such by other sections of Maoridom. 
In this definition, there is no mention of a 'common culture' or traditional and cultural 
values. There has been no comment so far on the differences between this definition of the 
tribal group 'iwi', and the Court of Appeal's approach to the definition of an ethnic group 
in King-Ansell v. Police. Interestingly, the New Zealand High Court defines iwi in a way 
that perhaps pushes the notion of the indigenous group closer to the objective idea of the 
aggregate with which we began this discussion. As will now be illustrated, this definition 
also sidesteps traditional means of identifying group membership of the main operational 
Maori group identity, the hapu. 
1. Identifying the Traditional Group 
Scholarship on traditional Maori social organisation shows the importance of being able to 
identify group members in order to facilitate social and cultural life. Anthropologists have 
... This recalls Professor Paul Morris' discussion of the inability of systems that recognise group rights to cope with ' boundary crossers·. for 
example. secularists is modem day Israel. (lecture 19"' of March 2001) 
'' [2000] I NZLR 285 
"'[20001 I ZLR 285. 325 
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long acknowledged whakapapa as the major determinant of group relationships. However, 
it is far more difficult to establish the boundaries of functioning groups in traditional Maori 
society. Such scholarship has demonstrated a useful differentiation between Maori 
'descent categories' and 'Maori descent groups' .
47 Descent categories merely include all 
descendants of a nominated ancestor, regardless of the social and cultural interaction 
between descendants. On the other hand, only regular contact and identification between 
members can form descent groups. Such groups are also known as 'corporate groups' and 
in Maori society the hapii was the pre-eminent corporate group: 'its members could unite 
to pursue some group objective, such as the defence of its territory, or large scale fishing 
operations .'48 
For members of a hapii to claim rights over the resources on a certain piece of land, those 
members had to be able to show regular and recognised interaction and habitation with 
other hapii members. This principle of land tenure is known as ahi kaa, or keeping the 
home fires burning. Maori Land Court minutes are replete with examples of hapii 
members seeking to demonstrate their maintenance of ahi kaa through occupation of a 
particular piece of land. There are also examples of hapii members who have failed to 
maintain regular interaction with other members of the hapii, allowing their group 
membership to lapse, thereby extinguishing ahi kaa. Such rights could be re-established, 
but often only with difficulty, and re-establishment could take up to or more than three 
generations to cement.49 Should erstwhile group members choose not to re-activate their 
membership of the group, they would, of course, retain their membership of the descent 
category. Kinship ties were often complex and marriage relationships allowed group 
membership to extend, to a certain point, to those who claimed primary hapii membership 
elsewhere. Members of other closely related hapii often attempted to demonstrate their 
rights in territory judged by the Maori Land Court to "belong' to another hapii. Such 
testimony show the fluidity of hapii relationships and that some limited rights in one piece 
of land could traditionally accrue to members of more than one hapii, provided those 
claiming the rights could show appropriate levels of corporate interaction with members of 
the hapii dominant in the claimed area. 
,· Eructi in Boast.RA Eructi. D McPhail and N F Smith Maori Land Law (Bunerworths. Wellington. 1999) 33 
''Eructi. above n 42. 36 
'° Eructi. above. n 42. 35 
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Traditional methods of 'closing' group membership included fulfilling the criteria required 
by ahi kaa, and patrilocal and patrilineal bias whereby hapU membership and residence 
were usually (but not always) defined by the male line.
50 As the 19th century wore on, 
however, traditional ways of determining group membership were undermined by the 
Native Land Court process. Patrilineal bias was extinguished at common law by the 
Papakura case.51 This was a succession case regarding Maori freehold land that trumped 
custom by insisting that Maori inherit property on an equal basis according to common law 
principles. Instead of rights to parcels of land passing to eldest sons, such land would be 
divided equally into ever-diminishing shares down the generations. This change has 
directly contributed to the overcrowded Maori land titles we see today. The practice of ahi 
kaa did remain important in the Native Land Court for determining who might be 
identified as the common law owners of Maori land. However, the Papakura case shows 
that the Court began to rely more heavily on claims of ancestry alone to determine who 
had rights to land, to the exclusion of other rights claims.
52 As New Zealand moved into 
the 20th century, genealogy became a primary indicator of group membership, not levels of 
corporate interaction. 
2. Identifying the Contemporary Group 
With the advent of the Treaty of Waitangi, colonisation, and urbanisation traditional 
formation of the Maori group has been largely undermined . In addition to hapU 
membership now being determined in many cases primarily by genealogy, many Maori 
now gain group identity from other types of contemporary groups . Church, sporting 
organisations, Urban Maori Authorities , pan-tribal groups and national organisations such 
as the Maori Women's Welfare League and the National Maori Council all offer a level of 
largely voluntary group membership. The range of group identities available for 
contemporary Maori is vastly different to that available to their ancestors. 
The language of the Treaty of Waitangi accords different types of rights to rangatira, hapU 
and individuals. In effect, these rights now extend also to iwi and pan-iwi organisations, as 
well as to all Maori regardless of iwi or hapU affiliation. As accepted by the Court of 
50 Erueti . above. n 42. 34 
" Papakura- Claim of Succession (12 April 1867). 1867 Gazelle 19-20 in Boast. RA Erueti. D McPhail and N F Smith Maori Land Law 
(Buttcrwonhs. Wellington. 1999) 77 
" Boast.RA Erueti . D McPhail and N F Smith Maori Land Law (Butterwonhs. Wellington. 1999) 45 
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Appeal in New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General, the Treaty is a document 
'relating to fundamental rights ... as a living instrument taking account of subsequent 
developments of International Human Rights norms.'s3 If indeed the DDRIP is intended to 
be a normative international human rights document, the Treaty should be interpreted in 
line with it. Alison Quentin Baxter suggests that the Draft Declaration could be a guide as 
a source of principles for implementing the Treaty, particularly in reconciling the exercise 
of rangatiratanga by Maori at the local and national level and kawanatanga by executive 
Government and Parliament.54 
Despite the existence of new types of groups in contemporary Maori society it is less 
certain which groups operate as socially functional groups rather than aggregates or 
interest groups.ss In reality significant number of Maori today exhibit fewer factors that 
distinguish us as an ethnic group according to traditional criteria and the definition offered 
in King-Ansell v. Police. Anthropologist Joan Metge recognises the modem, disparate 
nature of Maori identity and includes this quote from Mason Durie in her attempt to define 
the Maori community.s6 
Far from being homogenous Maori individuals have a variety of cultural 
characteristics and live in a number of cultural and socio-economic realities . The 
relevance of so-called traditional values is not the same for all Maori, not can it be 
assumed that all Maori wish to define their ethnic identities according to classical 
constructs. At the same time, they may well describe themselves as Maori, rejecting 
any notion that they are ' less Maori than their peers' ... self-identification conveys 
little in .. .lifestyle . . . and participation in ... whanau and hapii . 
Maori society and the shape of its components have always been dynamic. Hapu were 
always waxing or waning, with less powerful groups being absorbed by more powerful 
groups or disappearing altogether.s7 Contemporary Maori society is similarly fluid. This 
fluidity illustrates the difficulty of the nature of the rights such groups could hold. Many 
Maori, for example, are the products of the demographic disruptions of the Second World 
War and the rapid urbanisation of the 1950s and 1960s.s8 Younger Maori have been part of 
" 11987] 1 NZLR 641. 655 
"' Alison Quentin-Baxter ·Toe UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples - the international and constirutional law contexts.' 29 
(1999) VUWLR 85. 97-98 
" An example of Maori commonly expected to act in concerted group interest is the commonly expressed idea that Maori on the Maori electoral 
roll will somehow pursue group interests. despite the fact that such people are collected together mainly as an aggregation rather than a 
functioning group. 
56 Mason Durie in Joan Metge New Growth from Old- The Whanau in the Modern World (I 995. Victoria University Press . Wellington) 19 
' Ballara. A /wi - The Dynamics of Maori Tribal Organisation from c./769 to c.1945 (Victoria University Press . Wellington. 1998) 124. See also 
Schwimmer in Boast. RA Eructi. D McPhail and N F Smith Maori Land Law (Bunerworths. Wellington. 1999) 36 
" See for example. recent discussion on the development of pan-tribal culrure groups such as Ngati Poneke in Wellington in the 21930s. 1940s 
and beyond . As mentioned by Irihapcti Ramsden co-author of a recent book The Silenr Migration on the history if the club. it came together 
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the Maori Renaissance, almost from its very inception 30 years ago. They or their children 
are arguably freer to live their public lives in a far more culturally 'Maori' way than could 
previous generations. On the other hand many of these Maori now receive their cultural 
education from tertiary education providers and Urban Maori Authorities rather than the 
hapu or iwi group. The nature of contemporary group identity for Maori has thus greatly 
changed and is still changing. Therefore identifying those in the contemporary Maori 
population eligible for group rights is difficult. 
B Maori Views Of Individualism and Collectivism 
The submissions of indigenous representatives underlying the current form of the DDRIP 
strongly advocates that indigenous peoples are primarily collective peoples.59 Similarly, 
discourse about contemporary Maori identity can reflect an assumption that Maori 
essentially comprise a collective society. In part, this assumption has been fuelled by 
debate about the relationship between the treaty partners. This debate lends itself to an 
assumption of homogenous needs and characteristics within 'the Maori community' that 
does not accurately reflect social reality for many Maori. Undeniably collectivism is a 
strong aspect for many Maori in contemporary society, as it was in traditional society. That 
individualism has always been strong in Maori thought is less discussed in a rights context. 
5. The Miiori World View 
The following quote describes an idea that reappears in various forms m 
contemporary comment about Maori values and Maori society .(i) 
This indivisibility or inter-relationship [between the spiritual and the temporal] 
reflected what may be called the Maori view of the world - a warm and lasting 
communal bond among all things in nature with a common view of their inter-
dependence. This consciousness created a collective culture that has proved 
resilient. . .it continues to be the centre of the tribal circle, the foundation of a 
whispering ideology, identity strength and self-determination. 
through people who were often not related to each other at all . 50 years later there is a far higher degree of blood-kinship between the later 
generations who now make up the club. The basis for group association may be altering from commonality in experience to genealogical ties . 
Interview with Jrihapcti Ramsden (Chris Laidlaw 'Sunday Morning' . National Radio 30 September 2001) 
59 Sec comments made by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait islander Commission. elders of the Wangurri Clan. the Noongah People. and the 
Consejo Jnio de Sudarnerica in Julie Debeljak 'Barriers to the Recognition of Indigenous Peoples· Human Rights at the United Nations'(2000) 26 
Monash ULR 159. 181. 170. See CHR Report on the fourth open-ended inter-scssional WGDD EiC .4/ 1998/WG.IS/l 
"'Moana Jackson 'Criminality and the exclusion of Maori ' 20. 3 (1990) VUWLR 29. 
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Such commentators frequently discuss such a 'Maori view of the world' as if it is current 
and prevailing for Maori in general, with little analysis as to whether this is actually the 
case. An example of this type of assumption is present in Brian Garrity's 1999 article 
'Maori and Western concepts of Intellectual property. ' 61 He consistently conflates the 
traditional world view with the contemporary Maori world view with no analysis that takes 
into account the enormous and drastic changes undergone by Maori society in the past 160 
years. According to this long-lived view, Maori are a collective people.62 To stand beyond 
the group as an individual is to risk being called whakahihi - arrogant; a Maori version of 
the 'tall poppy syndrome.'63 Instead, membership of the whanau, hapii and iwi are the 
major determinants of status and identity. Elsdon Best is an early and influential 
proponent of the notion of 'Maori communism' .64 
In Maori society the individual could scarcely be termed a social unit , he was lost in 
the whanau or family group ... [T]he individual is as nothing- he does not exist as it 
were , as an individual, but only as part of the group or clan. 65 
This view is present to an extent in the writings of Buck and other earlier commentators, as 
well as in the work of latter authors such as Patterson describing the 'essentially collective 
identity' of Maori.66 Recent Maori commentators have also made such statements without 
critical analysis of what this 'collective identity' means.67 There has, however, also been a 
strand of New Zealand anthropological scholarship that has criticised this polarised view 
of Maori society . Raymond Firth was one of the first commentators to make such 
criticism.68 
[T]he individual can never be studied in entire isolation from the society; this does 
not entitle one to embrace the extreme position of ascribing all individual actions to 
the dictates of the group interest. 
"8 (1999) Auck ULR 1193-1209. 
• 2 See also Mason Durie Te Mana. Te Kawanatanga The Politics of Maori Self-Determination (Oxford University press. Auckland 1998) 21. 
TauriJ and A Morris '"Refonning justice: the potential of Maori processes" ( 1997) 30:2 Australian and New ?.ea/and Journal of Criminology 150 
"'New Zealand Law Commission Maori Custom and Values in New ?.ea/and Law (NZLC SP9. Wellington. 2001) 32. See also Linda Tuhiwai 
Smith ' In Search of a language and a Shareable Imaginative World' in Du Plessis and Alice (eds) Feminist Thought in Aotearoa New ?.ea/and 
(I 998. Oxford University Press. Auck.land) 99. 
64 In Raymond Firth Economics of the New ?.ea/and Maori (Government Printer. Wellington. 1959) 135 
65 See also He Hinatore kite Ao Maori -A Glimpse into the Maori World- Maori Perspectives on Justice (Ministry of Justice. Wellington. 
2001). At page 68. in the discussion of utu. the report notes 'the individual was simply a unit of the wider group.' 
66 John Pancrson Exploring Maori Values (The Dunmore Press. Palmcrston North. 1992) 154 . 
• - See Hineani Melbourne (cd) Maori Sovereignty-The Maori Perspective (Hodder Moa Beckett. Auck.land. 1995) . This book offers a series of 
interviews with prominent Maori leaders . Many of these commentators discuss the rise of tribalism and emphasis Maori collectivism. although 
few of these commentators illuminate the workings of collectivism beyond an ideal. 
" Raymond Firth Economics of the New ?.ea/and Maori (Government Printer. Wellington. 1959) 138 . It docs seem. on an adminedly shallow 
reading as yet. that ethnographers placed great emphasis on polarisation in Maori thought. (see for example. the writings of Alan and Louise 
Hanson . Hirini Mead and Anne Salmond) Hence the insistence on seeing concepts such as ' tapu' and ' noa· as diametrically opposed to each other 
(often translated still as ·sacred" and 'profane'). whereas the truth is far more likely to be found in the inter-relationship between the two 
concepts. This is not to say that conceptual polarisation did not exist at all. rather. shades of grey are also an important part of Maori philosophy 
and social organisation. 
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Of course there is plenty of evidence to illustrate the importance of the collective to the 
operation of Maori society. There is also plenty of evidence to show that there is an 
identifiable Maori view of the world. However, overstatement of the place of the 
collective denigrates the position of the individual in Maori thought. Furthermore, the 
assumption of the general application of such values ignores the reality for many 
contemporary Maori today. 
2. The Place of the Individual in Maori Thought 
The place of the individual in Maori traditional society was strong. This is indicated 
within Maori mythology, where fearless individuals such as Maui Tikitiki-a-Taranga 
engage in conflict and force change upon society, albeit ultimately for the benefit of the 
group. The place of the individual is also enshrined in concepts such as mana tangata, 
whereby mana could be gained and enhanced by individual action , often providing , of 
course, that there proved to be some benefit for the group from the increased mana of the 
individual.69 Positions of leadership within the hapii or iwi such as the role of the tohunga 
were certainly revered for their individual, specialist abilities. Apirana Ngata described the 
traditional role of the tohunga before Parliament in 1907, emphasising individual aspects 
of the role.70 
The law that governed the tribe practically emanated from .. . the tohunga .. . The law 
which meant life and death which dealt with everything pertaining to their 
cultivations , everything pertaining to their industries , everything pertaining to their 
moral life, and everything pertaining to their religious life emanated from tohunga. 
His word was law . 
This is a view of tohunga; as 'one marked out by signs.' 71 This view contrasts with other 
views of decision-making processes that align more with the idea of Maori as collective.72 
Tribal and sub-tribal policy was forged by consensus , with all the chiefs and elders 
having a say. Whenever the group gathered, matters of policy were discussed and 
the best orators commanded great influence . .. oratory became crucial to the exercise 
of leadership . 
"' New Zealand Law Commission Maori Cusrom and Values in New Z.ealand Law (NZLC SP9. Wellington. 2001 ) 33-34 
·o (July 191907) 139NZPD518 
-, Above n 10. 46 
-, Anne Salmond Hui: A Srudy of Maori Ceremonial Garherings(2ed . Reed Methuen. Auck.land . 1976) 14 
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It seems that the exercise of leadership fell between the spheres of the individual and the 
collective. Similarly, transmission of knowledge depended on relationships between 
teachers and pupils. A promising pupil would be fostered within the whare wananga, 
house of learning, and responsibility for that knowledge was transferred through these 
relationships. The idea of collective ownership of knowledge was not widespread. Te 
Miringa Hohaia describes traditional Taranaki teaching he received at Parihaka.73 
You look for any evidence that can prove that knowledge, matauranga Maori was 
owned collectively by the hapu or by an iwi. It is just not so. Knowledge was carried 
by people who were capable of carrying it, and they were all 
individuals ... knowledge is privately-owned. [I]t's not been given to the iwi. It's not 
been given to the hapu it's been given to you. You 're the one that has to stand up and 
carry this, you're the one who has to look for people that you're going to pass this on 
to so you are responsible for us and yourself. 
Maori traditional oral literature and whakapapa describes the actions and thoughts of 
individuals. Maori tribal formation has been dependent on the ability of able individuals to 
challenge and reject existing social arrangements, thereby creating new hapu and whanau 
groups.74 Ultimately individuals were responsible to the collective for their status and their 
survival. An apt, although rather phallocentric proverb expresses concisely the traditional 
relationship between the Maori individual and the Maori collective.75 
ma nga raho ka ti1 te ure 
the penis stands by means of the testes 
There has always been strong recognition m Maori thought of the individual who 
challenges the group, displaying unique qualities worthy of remembrance and song. To 
say otherwise is to deny a vital aspect of traditional Maori history and culture. 
3. The Contemporary World 
The place of the individual remains strong in Maori thought today, particularly taking into 
account the effects of colonisation. However, a significant amount of what is now written 
·, Tc Miringa Hohaia. spokesperson. writer and historian for the Parihaka Pa (Marnari Stephens 17 November 2000) transcript provided by Pito-
One Productions (N garuawahia). 
·, Ranginui Walker in Hincani Mclboume(cd) Maori Sovereignty- The Maori Perspective (1995 Hodder. Moa. Beckett Auckland) 26 
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about Maori relies implicitly or explicitly upon traditional notions of culture and society. 
A very recent and important report on Maori cultural practices from the Ministry of 
Justice, incorporating many Maori contributors certainly analyses the workings of 
collectivism in Maori traditional society but is silent on how such traditional modes of 
behaviour, such as collectivism, have translated into modem Maori life.
76 In this paper it 
has therefore been necessary to look a little further afield to gain some idea of any 
difference between traditional and contemporary notions of collectivism and 
individualism. 
A psychological study released in February 2001 by Victoria University of Wellington's 
School of Psychology has examined and compared the link between Maori and Pakeha 
ideas of individualism and collectivism, self-esteem and enhancement. This study suggests 
that collectivism and individualism remain strong in the Maori community .
77 
Rather than finding New Zealanders of European and Maori origins polarised on 
measures of individualism/collectivism and self-enhancement, we found rather more 
subtle differences between them, anchored by large amounts of similarity. 
In other words, Pakeha are not exclusively individualistic, nor are Maori exclusively 
collective in their expressions of identity. Measures of collectivism were significantly 
higher for Maori than for Pakeha, but not at the expense of the place of the individual. The 
common assumption that Maori are a primarily collective people, or collection of primarily 
collective peoples, simply does not stand up to scrutiny. 
There are valid reasons why collectivism and traditionalism are emphasised in identity 
discourse. Traditional Maori knowledge and its application is recognised as a means of 
assisting Maori to extract themselves from subordination in New Zealand society. On the 
other hand, acknowledging the subordinate position and the socio-political reality facing 
many Maori today would require acknowledging that much of that precious knowledge has 
-, Traditional whakatauaki. Timoti Karetu. former Maori Language Commissioner (Tainui Stephens . January 2001 ) transcript provided by Pito-
One Productions (Ngaruawahia). 
-. He Hinatore ki le Ao Maori -A Glimpse imo 1/ze Maori World- Maori Perspec1ives on Jus1ice (Ministry of Justice. Wellington. 2001) To be 
fair. the introduction to the document states that the report illustrates traditional practices. Nevertheless. during the report there appears to be an 
underlying assumption that the values described therein remain normative for Maori today. 
- . Leigh Harrington and James H. Liu 'Self-enhancement and attitudes towards high achievers: A Bicultural view of the independent and 
interdependent sclr (Unpublished paper February 200 I. School of Psychology. Victoria University of Wellington) 18. This paper collated data 
from approximately 370 students of Maori and Pakeha descent. The study linked feelings of self-enhancement with notions of individual and 
collective self-identification. This sample is limited. but the results are supported by other data from larger surveys such at the \inter-
Generational Relations and Positive Aging Research Programme. 
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been irrevocably lost. To write about the Maori world-view is always to be reminded of 
the pain of the loss of so much of that world-view. 
That such a description is still common illustrates a response to the extraordinary historical 
and contemporary pressures faced by the Maori. Recent Marxist-influenced writers such 
as Steven Webster and Elizabeth Rata point to an emerging ' neotribalism' and an 
increasing gap between the portrayal of Maori culture and acknow ledgment of Maori 
political and historical reality. As the Maori Renaissance continues, Maori seek collective 
autonomy or tino rangatiratanga, using the tools of ' [e]thnification and indigenisation [as] 
attempts to restore traditional social relations and secure political and economic autonomy 
from dominant Pake ha society.' 78 The cost of this path, according to Webster, is a refusal 
effectively to acknowledge widespread loss of contact between many Maori and their 
political and historical reality .79 
The ideological identification between Maori culture and Maori society conceals an 
actual separation between them; while every New Zealander knows of the closeness 
of Maori to their ancestral land in abstract terms, the specific historical struggles 
have often been ... too exhausting even to remember these grievances , let alone 
emotionally to identify with the land and the ancestry from which they derive , and to 
organise politically . . . 
Perhaps romanticising our Maori heritage has been a necessary step to reclaiming it. The 
idea of belonging to a collective identity prescribed by hapu and iwi is extraordinarily 
powerful and regenerative. What must be acknowledged is the journey that has to be taken 
by disenfranchised Maori individuals before they can truly claim/reclaim such valuable 
group membership. As will be demonstrated Section IV , many such indigenous 
individuals may well be unable eventually to claim this group membership without an 
independent individual right to determine indigenous identity. 
C Conclusion 
Under customary law many Maori families gave up their rights to be included in the 
traditional hapu descent group. According to the Court of Appeal in King-Ansell v. Police 
such families would probably not be deemed practising members of an ethnic group. 
Under Te Waka Hi lka o Te Arawa v Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission such Maori 
·, Elizabeth Rata A Polirical Economy of Neorribal Capiral (Lexington Books . Maryland . 2000) 6-7 
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still qualify, by reason of membership of the descent category, as members of an iwi. This 
is an odd fruit of colonisation and our unique history. Maori may be considered as 
members of a redefined traditional iwi without being members of an ethnic group or even 
traditionally recognised members of a hapu. 
This anomalous situation will be similar for other indigenous societies still adapting and 
responding to their unique historical and cultural legacies. What then, is the application of 
a Draft Declaration of mainly group rights for people who may not fit under the category 
of 'group'? 
Ultimately the concept of the 'group' behind the Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples is problematic. The document is founded primarily in 
communitarianism, and according to Adeno Addis, ultimately this approach holds little 
hope for minorities wishing to reassert themselves.8() 
It is assimilationist in its nationalist dimension and exclusionist in its localist 
version ... [T]he best way to think of groups is ... to acknowledge their important and 
pervasive role in our lives, and ... to acknowledge their instability and 
transformability. 
Many of the people who most desperately need the rights included in such a Declaration 
will find themselves excluded by externally and internally imposed definitions of the 
'group'. It is time to investigate the concept of the independent individual right to 
determine indigenous identity as may be available under an amended Article 8 of the 
DDRIP. Such a right, with appropriate recognition, may ultimately enable indigenous 
individuals not only to claim indigenous identity, but also eventually to access group 
identification and entree into group rights. 
III AN INDEPENDENT RIGHT TO DETERMINE INDIGENOUS IDENTITY? 
Sections II and III have investigated the limited coverage of group rights for the needs of 
indigenous people. As the preceding pages have demonstrated, collective rights are 
difficult to apply to certain indigenous people for whom collective identity is non-existent, 
unsure, or nascent. For such people a compromise may be available in an independent 
·, Steven Webster Patrons of Maori Culture - Power, Theory and Ideology in the Maori Renaissance (University of Otago Press. Dunedin . 1998) 
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individual right to determine indigenous identity in an amended Article 8 of the Draft 
Declaration of the Rights on Indigenous Peoples. The suggested wording is shown in 
square brackets, in bold. 
Indigenous peoples [and individuals] have the right to maintain and develop their 
distinct identities and characteristics, including the right to identify themselves as 
indigenous and be recognised as such. 
This wording is similar in tone to the wording of Article 9 granting indigenous peoples and 
individuals the right to belong to an indigenous community or nation. Certainly the idea of 
an individual right to self-identify is not new and discussion of it predates the Draft 
Declaration.81 The distinction in this discussion is that I refer to an 'independent' 
individual right to determine identity. Article 8 already acknowledges an individual right 
to determine indigenous identity. The use of the term 'Indigenous peoples' to open the 
article shows that nature of the indigenous identity able to be claimed is a group identity. 
An independent individual right to determine indigenous identity is a little different. The 
independent right enables indigenous people to claim an indigenous identity that may be 
but is not necessarily a group identity. There are many indigenous individuals that cannot 
simply claim a group identity on the basis of genealogy alone. They lack characteristics 
that enable them to be defined unequivocally as part of any indigenous group. Such 
individuals can, however, take on these characteristics voluntarily over a period of time. 
With appropriate recognition by other indigenous people of a particular indigenous group, 
such re-enfranchised indigenous people may ultimately be able to claim indigenous group 
identity. For such marginalised people, that claim can only result from the earlier exercise 
of a right in response to a human need; the independent individual right to determine 
indigenous identity. 
The nature and extent of such a right has not yet been defined. As will be argued in this 
section the independent individual right to determine indigenous identity is an important 
moral right that exists independently of the right potentially contained in the DDRIP. Its 
place in the hierarchy of moral rights is yet to be determined because the right itself has 
only recently been discovered. The relationship between the individual right and the 
"' Adeno Addis ' Individualism. Communitarianism and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities' 66. 1219 (1991) Notre Dame L Rev 615. 647 
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collective right to determine indigenous identity shows that both rights do depend on each 
other. For indigenous people it is essential that both rights be recognised to ensure the 
effective participation of indigenous individuals and groups in rights protection. 
While both rights are essential for indigenous peoples there has been conflict between 
indigenous groups and indigenous individuals over the exercise of the right to determine 
indigenous identity. Indigenous peoples must recognise the existence of such conflict and 
work to ensure that individual and collective rights to determine indigenous identity are 
upheld by indigenous peoples as much as by non-indigenous peoples. Perhaps indigenous 
groups are under a duty concomitant with their right to include, respect and protect all 
indigenous members of their group, estranged or not. Indigenous individuals are also 
limited in the exercise of their right to determine indigenous identity. They must be subject 
to some test that limits the application of the right in some way. That test must be an open 
one to avoid the potential injustice and irrelevance of blood quantum requirements and the 
like. Ultimately recognition of the indigenous individuals by significant others also of that 
indigenous identity serves as an adequate test to determine those able to exercise an 
individual right to determine indigenous identity. 
A Recognising a Right 
The discourse about indigenous rights can be confusing and 'the clarity of the concept has, 
unfortunately, not matched its popularity .82 In part the confusion arises from the different 
sources of rights. Some of the rights of indigenous peoples discussed in this paper stem 
from legislation, such as Canada's Indian Act. Others stem from particular legally 
recognised doctrines, such as the doctrine of aboriginal rights; the principle that the 
customary rights of indigenous peoples in colonised territories are preserved until 
expressly extinguished by Parliament.83 Other rights descend from instruments such as the 
Treaty of Waitangi concluded between specific peoples. Others rights have developed, or 
are developing within the context of international human rights instruments such as the 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples . Even aside from these rights others exist, shadowy and yet to be 
defined properly, if at all. 
Wendy Moss "Indigenous Self-Government in Canada and Sexual Equality under the Indian Act: Resolving conflicts between Collective and 
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Looking at these different sources, it is possible to distinguish between legal and moral 
rights.84 Legal rights accrue to an individual or a group on the basis that certain rules state 
that such rights are to be granted, such as tax rebates, or property rights. Moral rights use 
the language of 'should' and ought' and their existence is established by moral argument. 
Moral rights may or may not be reflected in rules. Moral rights are difficult to define 
exactly, unlike rules, and there is no limit to such rights that may be said to exist. 
Ultimately, moral rights are rights to certain types of freedom. They are not always 
absolute because rights conflict with each other, but the breach of a moral right requires 
much more moral justification than does the breach of a rule. In the case of individuals, 
moral rights constitute a freedom to act in a certain way. Similarly, collective rights define 
a domain of freedom of action for the collective. 
Such rights are not necessarily permanent. As Ormsby points out, the rights contained in 
the Magna Carta were deemed to be important at the time of its signing, but only some 
have survived into present rights theory. Charles Taylor observes that the pre-occupation 
with concepts of identity is a modern phenomenon, and that rights to have identity 
recognised are recent rights that would have made little sense to our ancestors.
85 
The link between identity and the appropriate recognition of that identity has become very 
strong indeed. For indigenous peoples not to have their identity recognised, or even to 
have it misrecognised can 'inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with crippling 
self-hatred.' Indeed, according to Charles Taylor, due recognition of indigenous identity is 
not merely respectful, it fulfils a human need.86 Such a need gives rise to a moral right to 
have one's own indigenous identity recognised. Identity is, however, negotiable.
87 
Thus my discovering my own identity doesn't mean that I work it out in isolation, 
but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others. 
[T]he development of an ideal of inwardly generated identity gives a new 
importance to recognition. My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical 
relations with others. 
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But if determining identity cannot be an individual process alone, prescribed by an 
individual right, neither is it only a collective process prescribed only by a collective right 
in the contemporary world faced by indigenous peoples. 
B An Independent Individual Right 
My argument that an individual right must exist independently within the terms of Article 
8 of the DDRIP is a moral one. The right itself is a pre-existing moral right predating the 
creation of the Draft Declaration or any other instrument. In other words, indigenous 
individuals 'should' have the fundamental freedom to determine their own indigenous 
identity. It appears however that the individual right expressed in Article 8 is only directed 
at determining group identity. It may not be possible to have an effective individual right 
to determine indigenous group identity if significant numbers of indigenous individuals are 
excluded from any collective entity in the first place. If a right does not exist that allows 
indigenous individuals to determine indigenous identity outside of a group entity, 
thousands, if not millions of indigenous people who have been estranged from indigenous 
groups through processes such as colonisation are denied the fundamental freedom to 
determine their cultural identity. This independent individual right should exist so that as 
many indigenous people as possible can have access to fundamental freedoms protected by 
indigenous rights . 
1. The relationship between the individual and collective right 
The position that the individual right needs to be recognised in order to access individual 
and collective protection could be accused of reflecting 'consequential individualism.' As 
discussed by Addis, this idea holds that collective rights can only be understood as 
individual rights in the first place.88 
[l]t sees the concept of group rights in strategic and temporary terms. This concept 
is to be deployed , not because ... because there is an intrinsic value in conferring 
rights on groups, but because that might be the only way to correct structural and 
institutional defects which are seen as impediments to treating people as individuals. 
" Adeno Addis 'Individualism. Communitarianism and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities' 66. 1219. (1991) Notre Dame L Rev 615. 631 
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While Addis sees the individual right as ultimately undermining the collective right I see 
the existence of the independent individual right to determine indigenous identity as the 
method of fixing historical defects that exclude individuals from group membership. 
Groups are moral units that are capable of bearing rights. The individual right to 
determine indigenous identity ultimately supports the group unit by enabling more people 
eventually to access group identity. For individuals who have been estranged from their 
indigenous group, one way, perhaps the only way to become eligible for inclusion in that 
group is to develop their individual indigenous identity. Such individuals may only 
develop their individual indigenous identities if they have the right to determine their 
adherence to that identity in the first place. Once such individuals can become more 
confident in their indigenous identity they are far more likely to be eligible for membership 
in and recognition from the indigenous group. Thus the exercise of the independent 
individual right to determine indigenous identity can be seen as a right that ultimately 
strengthens indigenous group identity. 
What is less clear is where this right will sit in the hierarchy of moral rights. This 
individual right, as with the concomitant collective right, has only recently been 
'discovered' and exists in response to the specific conditions of indigenous peoples that 
has arisen over the past two or three centuries of conquest and colonisation. Such rights 
are yet to pass the test of time that other moral rights have had to undergo. The rights that 
are the strongest and most likely to be observed are the ones who have been acknowledged 
for the longest period.89 The short life of the individual right to determine indigenous 
identity does not reflect on its present importance. Such a right is clearly of great 
importance to those for whom indigenous rights may well be inapplicable without it. That 
importance may not, however, be as strong in the next century, depending on the status and 
needs of the people who might need the right at that time. 
C A Conflict Of Indigenous Rights 
Most discussion of the rights included in the DDRIP concentrates on the actual and 
potential conflict between states and indigenous peoples over the exercise of collective 
rights because such rights could threaten the political integrity of unitary states. As 
discussed by Maurice Ormsby, collective rights are certainly threatened by individuals or 
'° M J Ormsby 'Individual and Collective Rights' (Unpublished paper prepared for the Ministry of Justice. !997) 24 
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groups, including governments, operating outside the sphere of the collective. However, 
the operation of collective rights is also threatened by those within the collective, or on the 
edges of the collective 'behaving in ways that [undermine] the group's collective 
purposes .'9(} 
Some attention has been paid to cases such as Thomas v Norris which illustrate the conflict 
between indigenous individuals wishing to assert already-recognised individual human 
rights against groups wishing to assert collective rights.91 Less attention has yet been paid 
within the discourse to the potential for conflict between indigenous individuals wishing to 
assert a right to indigenous identity and indigenous collectives wishing to exclude such 
individuals from that identity. Canadian case-law offers some instructive examples of such 
conflict. 
Due to the federal Indian Act, Canada offers plenty of material for analysis of the conflict 
of individual and collective rights to determine identity. As will be shown, significant case 
law has developed around the Act that involves individuals attempting to have their status 
as band members recognised by specific bands. While the Canadian material focuses on 
conflict between people who want to assert the group indigenous identity, as opposed to an 
individual indigenous identity, the issues are very relevant for determining the extent of 
any indigenous right to determine indigenous identity. 
1. The Canadian Indian Act: Relevant Background 
For any discussion of Canadian case law, the contextual legislative framework must be 
briefly investigated to understand the conflicts that have arisen between groups and 
individuals attempting to assert indigenous Indian identity. The Indian Act of 1985 
descends from the original 1876 legislation aiming to regulate the use of Indian Reserve 
land and establish a system of band (tribal) councils. This Federal Act also imposes 
definitions of who is and who is not an Indian for the purposes of the legislation.92 The 
90 M J Ormsby 'Individual and Collective Rights' (Unpublished paper prepared for the Ministry of Justice. 1997) 42 
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legislation and its 1985 amendments (commonly known as Bill C-31) divide Indian people 
into four groups.93 
1. Indians who are both registered and entitled to band membership 
1. Indians who are registered but without an automatic right to band membership 
2. Band members who cannot be registered 
3. Indians without band membership, who are not entitled to registration. 
Essentially 'Indians' are those with recognised band membership. Such people are known 
as 'status' or 'registered' Indians. These people are entitled to live on reserve lands and 
have been subject to tax exemptions and other special laws. People who are of mixed 
blood, without the requisite band membership, are 'non-status' and thus excluded from 
consideration under the Act. There are also registered band members who are 'non-status', 
and there are non-status, non-band members who are nonetheless still considered Indian, 
while still ineligible for the purpose of the Act. 
One of the great injustices under the Act before the passage of Bill C-31 in 1985 was the 
old section 12(1) (b) which stripped Indian women of their status if they married non-
Indian men. The children of such marriages were also denied status. While this section 
has been repealed the new s 6(2) employs the now notorious 'second generation cut off 
rule', whereby status is terminated for Indians with fewer than two Indian grandparents. 
Many commentators are deeply concerned about the long-term effects of this rule. While 
in the short term the amendments to the Indian Act reinstated about 100 ,OOO Indians to 
their status, the cut-off rule is likely to have a more permanent deleterious effect. 
Intermarriage has, of course, continued, and fewer of the resulting children are able to 
claim two Indian grandparents. As Palmater notes, some of the smaller bands' numbers 
have already markedly reduced since the passage of the amendments, a phenomenon that is 
likely to continue.94 Harry Daniels, former president of the Congress of Aboriginal 
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Peoples notes the pressure Bill C-31 has placed on existing Aboriginal communities to 
adjust their membership according to the dictates of the legislation.95 
The new rules obviously place tremendous pressure on existing status Indian communities 
to take steps to maintain the ' racial ' purity of their community and to discourage unions 
with Non-Status partners . Given the long history of inter-marriage between Indian and 
European immigrants to the New World ... such attempts are likely to prove futile in the 
long run, ethically controversial in the short run. 
The unique Canadian legislation and the limited resources available to bands to develop 
and maintain their reservations ensure that there is noticeable conflict in the public arena 
between indigenous people as to who may be counted as indigenous and who may not. In 
this context we are able to see clearly the conflict between groups and individuals over the 
rights to determine indigenous identity. 
2. Cases illustrating a conflict of rights 
It is to be noted that this paper is arguing for the existence of an Article 8 independent 
indigenous right to determine indigenous identity, whether that identity is group or 
individual. This Canadian material focuses on conflict between people who want to assert 
the group identity rather than individual identity. Nevertheless this material is still useful 
for our purpoises because it gives a few hints as to how to resolve tension between 
indigenous individuals and collectives over determining identity. 
One of the most important tensions has arisen between Indian women and their bands. 
Under the Indian Act bands have the prima facie right to determine their own membership 
(unless over-ridden by Federal jurisdiction). On several occasions bands have excluded 
women who have married out of the band despite having their status returned to them after 
the passage of Bill C-31 . These conflicts have seen Indian women asserting their 
individual human rights , as guaranteed by the Constitution Act 1982, against the group 
rights of the band, as granted by the Indian Act , to determine its own membership. 
•• Harry W Daniels ' Bill C-31: The Abocide Bill ' Congress of Aboriginal Peroplcs (1 998) http:/iwww.abo-pcnplcs .org/procrnmsid nl sc-31 .html 
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Two such cases are Sawridge Band v Canada and Scrimbett v Sakimay Indian Band 
Council .96 Both cases were heard in the Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division. Both 
cases also involved the rights of women who had originally lost their Indian status by 
marrying non-Indians, but who been reinstated to their Indian status under Bill C-31. Such 
women claimed the right to be included in band membership, while the bands resisted such 
a right, citing that such a right would infringe the band's right to determine the membership 
of the band. At the bottom of the bands' concerns is a fear that band resources , already 
meagre , will be stretched too far to cope with any influx of returning members. While the 
cases concentrate on the legislative provisions of the Indian Act· that allow the band the 
legal right to define their own membership , the deeper issue is the clash of the collective 
moral right to determine indigenous identity with the individual's moral right to determine 
indigenous identity . 
The applicant band in the mammoth 79 day trial in the case of Sawridge Band v Canada 
attempted to persuade the Court that it had a customary right to determine its own 
membership. The Court held that the band in question had no such customary right, and 
that to plead the existence of such a right would constitute 'fictitious revisionism' .
97 
. . . this Court finds that there was no "Aboriginal" and certainly no treaty "right of 
members of the said bands under the irrespective [sic] customary laws , to determine 
membership in the bands and to veto the admission of any persons to membership in 
the said bands. 
This judgement and accompanying comment is interesting because the supreme legal right 
to determine band membership is ultimately vested in the Canadian Government , 
regardless of mechanisms the bands put in place under the Indian Act. In Sawridge the 
band was held to have no legal right, no doctrinal aboriginal right and no treaty right to 
determine the membership of the band.98 No reference was made to Article 8 of the 
DDRIP. The Court did not address the issue of whether the band had some other moral 
right to define its make-up . Indeed the Court seems to have assumed that there was in fact 
a moral duty to ensure that the band had no such right. On reflection , however , it was 
surely open to argue that an indigenous group should or ought to have a right to say who 
does and who does not belong. The Court has , in its analysis , jumped to the end result of 
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the possible unjust exclusion without investigating the moral worth and hierarchical weight 
of such a right in the first place. 
In Scrimbett v Sakimay Indian Band the Sakimay Band also attempted to rely on the 
existence of a customary right to justify the exclusion of women who had married outside 
the band.99 They attempted to argue that such a right was protected pursuant to ss35(1 ), 25 
and 28 of Constitution Act 1982 which guarantees that rights and freedoms within the 
Charter shall not be construed so as to undermine any 'aboriginal , treaty or other right or 
freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal people of Canada.' 100 In reply , the Court again 
declined to directly deal with the legitimacy of a right to determine membership. Instead, 
the Court stated that the right the band was trying to claim was in fact the right to deny 
voting rights to band members . The Court held there could be no such right and that the 
applicant Mary Scrimbett had a right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law under 
s15(1) of the Charter. They held that the band had violated this right. 
It seems in Scrimbett that the Court has perhaps deliberately sidestepped deeper waters by 
narrowing down the ambit of the right claimed by the band. By doing so the Court was 
able to avoid moral arguments as to whether a band has a right to determine its own 
membership that exists separately to treaty , charter and legislative rights . It was also able 
to avoid any discussion of the relative status of such a right in context with other rights . 
D Limits on the Collective and Independent Individual rights to Determine 
Indigenous Identity. 
The Canadian Federal Courts 'resolved' the conflict between the individual and collective 
rights to determine indigenous identity by denying the existence of any right and certainly 
without reference to the Article 8 of the DDRIP. Instead resolution of the conflict was 
made by reference to the UN Declaration of Human Rights , and indigenous collective 
needs were undermined. 
As these cases dealt with claims to indigenous group identity, it is possible that the conflict 
could have been resolved by reference to the existing Article 8. If it can be accepted that 
Article 8 of the DDRIP should be amended to reflect an expanded independent individual 
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right to determine indigenous identity, more future conflicts could be mediated with 
reference to Article 8 alone. 
In order for Article 8 to be used in such a way there needs to be limits on the individual 
and collective rights. 
1. Limits on the Collective Right to Determine Indigenous Identity 
Despite the Canadian Courts' refusal to acknowledge or analyse the existence of a group 
right to determine group membership, indigenous peoples themselves argue that this right 
exists and is a natural and fundamental right that goes to the heart of minority or 
indigenous rights.101 An indigenous person may claim the identity of an indigenous group, 
and the test will usually include the recognition and affirmation of that same group, as 
discussed by Woodhouse and Richardson JJ in the King v Ansell case.102 Any test to 
determine collective group identity is applied by the collective on its own terms and cannot 
be ascertained objectively in all cases. There are also other limitations to such a group 
right. According to Palmater this fundamental group right to determine identity is 
accompanied by an equally fundamental duty. 103 
[T]his right carries with it a tremendous responsibility to ensure that all members of 
the community are included, protected and respected . [H]ow they identify as 
Aboriginal peoples is their right as human .. . which must be allowed to evolve over 
time to incorporate the modern realities of our social interaction and changing 
cultures. 
The idea of a group owing itself such a duty was discussed in the case of Scrimbett. Mary 
Scrimbett alleged that the Sakimay band had owed her a fiduciary duty that arose from a 
position of trust between Council members and band members. While the Court held that 
there was no fiduciary duty, the band itself acknowledges the existence of a duty that 
presumably accompanied the claimed right to determine band membership. The band 
states however, that that any such duty is owed only to the band and not to individuals.104 
If groups indeed do have the moral, if not legal right to determine their identity, the idea of 
a concomitant duty to respect, include and protect all members of the group may apply. If 
it may be said that a group owes such a duty to its own group, it may not be such a leap to 
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owe such a duty to those members on the edge of the group. Perhaps such a duty could 
even be owed to those indigenous individuals who have been excluded from functional 
group membership for all the reasons we have discussed so far in this paper. The question 
as to who is entitled to be called indigenous in the first place can be resolved with 
reference to the individual right to determine indigenous identity, as will be discussed 
shortly. A moral duty to include, protect and respect that could include marginalised 
members could help resolve conflict between the individual and collective indigenous 
rights to determine identity. The group right to determine identity would have the burden 
to discharge of demonstrating that it is including, protecting and respecting its own 
members, even while it attempts to exclude the individual in question. Discharging that 
burden may help make the decision as to which right should have precedence; the 
individual or the collective. 
2. Limits on the Individual Right to determine Indigenous Identity 
As discussed above, the collective right may be limited by specific group tests as well as 
the collective moral duty to include, protect and respects all indigenous members of a 
particular indigenous group, even marginalised members. There must also be a test to 
determine who can claim an individual right to determine group or individual indigenous 
identity. 
Previous tests in determining identity have included closed notions, such as blood quantum 
and certified genealogies. In the New Zealand context McGuire suggests a return to 'say a 
minimum of fifty percent Maori blood, as the requirement for qualifying for membership 
of the group Maori.' 105 In the Sawridge case Muldoon J notes with frank distaste that 
certain bands were 'conjuring' with the practice of 'blood quantum' to determine band 
membership. He goes on to observe: 106 
One hopes that people who characterise themselves as generous, hospitable and 
living in tune with Mother Earth and all nature will not set out to turn some 
unfortunates among their number against their own grandparents. 
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Other supposedly fixed indices such as genealogical records are also problematic and very 
manipulable, as demonstrated amply in the minutes of the Maori land Court. 
The criteria for group recognition is determined by the group. In the case of an amended 
Article 8 including an independent individual right to determine an individual indigenous 
identity, the test may seem a little different. Indigenous individuals can identify as such 
indigenous individuals because the people they love and who love them reflect that identity 
back to them. Such recognition may be given by select individuals rather than by 
collective entities. Again, the criteria for such recognition is determined severally by those 
who extend the recognition to the individual concerned. Indigenous people are able assert 
individual indigenous identity because they are recognised by significant others in their 
lives as indigenous. As stated by Charles Taylor: 107 
It is not surprising that in the culture of authenticity, relationships are seen as the key 
loci of self-discovery and self-affirmation. Love relationships are ... crucial because 
they are crucibles of inwardly generated identity. 
In ascertaining the limits of such a test it would be reasonable to assume that at least some 
of the individuals and groups who extend recognition to another indigenous individual are 
themselves indigenous. This test need not therefore be an excuse for vexatious or bad faith 
claims to indigenous identity. 
Perhaps an effective way to illustrate the operation of the test for someone to claim an 
independent indigenous right to determine indigenous identity is to show how it might 
work practically in my own family. 
J. A brief personal illustration 
I am the youngest of three siblings from my father ' s first marriage. He was raised by his 
grandmother in the Far North community of Waihopo until the age of six, after which time 
he was taken to Auckland to live with his mother and his Pakeha stepfather. In Auckland, 
Dad found out he was different. 108 
I know now that one reason Dad was so driven to achieve success was to simply do 
better than the white man. His earliest memories seemed to revolve only around the 
,o- Charles Taylor Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition" (Princeton University press, Princeton 1992) 36 
••• Tainui Stephens ' He iti taku iti' in Growing Up Maori (Tandem Press. Auckland. 1998) 271 
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shame of being Maori. On the Otahuhu bus and in his Avondale school he was 
taunted by dimwits of the day , saying that he and his beloved Nana stank. 
By the age of 15 due, in part, to appalling mistreatment by his step-father, my father had 
decided essentially to reject his Maori , Te Rarawa identity, and to seek his place in the 
Pakeha world well away from his tribal lands and the influence of Maori culture. 
He has lived in Australia for 31 years, and only now is beginning to feel some sort of pride 
in his whakapapa and heritage. His six children, in the meantime , were raised with little or 
no direct contact with his culture, no Maori language and no 'internal sense of recognition ' 
by which we could judge ourselves members of an ethnic group. While the children raised 
in New Zealand had our Pakeha mother try to instill some sense of pride in being Maori, 
we had no way of living what that actually meant. As a family , we certainly failed the test 
in King-Ansell v. Police. We had no characteristics to share with other Maori , and as 
Christchurch raised, Pakeha-looking children, we would certainly fail any objective test by 
disinterested observers Pakeha or Maori .109 Certainly by traditional standards of defining 
descent-group membership we had also relinquished any rights which might have accrued 
to us by virtue of our descent from our hapu . We had no regular interaction with other 
members of our hapu, we resided on another island. We were part of the descent category, 
not the descent group. At least from our genealogy we would still qualify under Te Waka 
Hz lka o Te Arawa v. Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission for membership of an iwi. 
It is only in the last two decades that I and my siblings have individually and consciously 
decided to identify culturally as Maori and develop that cultural identity. On deciding on 
such paths, we had no group membership to easily slot into. As siblings, our journeys have 
been, initially at least, separate journeys. Almost all understanding I now have of Maori 
culture is a direct result of an independent, individual conscious decision in my late teens 
to pursue such knowledge . According to my mother when I was growing up , my father was 
a 'three-quarter caste' while I 'was between a one-third and half caste'. In such a category 
and being the great-grandchild of five Pakeha and three Maori, it was easily available to 
me to choose differently. Equally, it was possible for my father to choose to opt out of his 
ethnic group identity by essentially running away from our tribal area to start a new life. 
109 This issue is also discussed by Jeremy McGuire ' Reficctions on the Formal Defi nitions of Maori" [ 1995] NZU 168- 172. 
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My New Zealand-born brothers and I have chosen independently of each other to exercise 
an independent right to determine our own Maori identity. All three of us speak Maori to a 
greater or lesser extent. We identify publicly as Maori of Te Rarawa iwi and the Ngati 
Moetonga and Te Rokeka hapu. We all identify with the Wainui and Te OhakI marae in 
Ahipara. We bury the placenta of the next generation in our whanau urupa, or cemetery, 
we occasionally attend hui, tangi and other gatherings in Ahipara. I would observe that 
these are learned behaviours we did not do or understand 25 years ago. It is also 
questionable what sort of identity it is that we have sought. Initially we sought merely to 
be generically 'Maori', whatever that meant. In our family, my older brother Tainui 
opened the way for the rest of us, when he was a student at Canterbury University in the 
1970s.110 
This instilled in me the desire to spend more and more time with the Maori 
community and I asked my lecturer. . .if it might be possible to spend the holidays 
with his iwi at Tokomaru bay .. . Bill agreed , but then asked me , 'Wouldn ' t it be 
better if you did this amongst your own iwi?' Good point Bill. But who the hell were 
my iwi? 
For each of us, collective identity is what we ultimately seek, but we can' t just produce it 
overnight. It takes work. Whakapapa gets us in the door; we have to do the rest 
voluntarily .111 
It was time to find my iwi. 
I made my way from Christchurch to the Far North - to the Hok.ianga. When I 
knocked on the door to my grandfather 's house, I guess I had harboured visions of 
what he would be like - what they would be like - which, in retrospect , were too 
romantic to be real. When Bobby Roberts opened the door the romantic and the real 
came together in the old, very real , man standing there with an enquiring look on his 
face. 
"Tena koe, I'm your grandson." 
According to Michael McDonald's notion that membership of an ethnic group would be 
involuntary, we children fail to qualify. Even now it could be argued that we still have not 
activated our rights to be included in the traditional hapu descent group. Our contact is 
still too sporadic, and I, at least, sometimes feel a little like a tourist. Only consistency, 
presence and practical contribution to the hapu community over years to come will dilute 
that feeling. 
110 Stephens. above n 98. 276 
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Under Article 8 of the Draft Declaration, as it presently stands, I have not in the past been 
a functioning member of a 'people' to which the article refers. That article therefore gives 
me no right to claim any indigenous identity. However, under an amended Article 8 I 
could claim an independent individual right to determine an indigenous identity that is not 
necessarily collective. Until I can claim such a collective identity, I claim the right to be 
an indigenous individual. I pass the test of indigenousness not because of blood quantum, 
or even necessarily because of a certified bona fide whakapapa, although that can certainly 
be provided if necessary. I pass the test because my mother, my siblings, my father, my 
aunty residing in Ahipara, my Auckland cousins and my partner, among others, all 
recognise me as being indigenous. My Maori friends at university recognise me as 
indigenous. Some of these people are of Te Rarawa descent some are not. They treat me 
as indigenous, they speak of me to other people as indigenous. People who love me and 
who are significant others in my life recognise me as indigenous and of Te Rarawa, Ngati 
Moetonga, Te Rokeka descent. Some of these people do not constitute a functioning 
collective, in some senses they are individuals but lightly linked to each other. 
By virtue of our dislocated family history and my own tardiness in establishing myself as 
part of the hapu or iwi collective, the nature of the indigenous identity I have a right to 
claim is not necessarily true functioning col}ective identity. That will come. For now, I 
pass the test that would enable me to claim the independent individual right to determine 
indigenous identity. 
IV CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have argued for amending Article 8 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples to include an independent individual right to determine indigenous 
identity. Without this right, indigenous people who are as yet unable to claim functional 
group membership are excluded from the protections of the Draft Declaration. Instead, the 
document remains focused on collective rights and collective entities. This paper 
demonstrates that some of the assumptions underlying indigenous rights discourse may 
hinder rather than help the development of indigenous peoples. While it is clear that 
collectivity is extremely important to many indigenous communities, the application of 
group rights may not afford the fullest possible protections for indigenous heritage. 
111 Stephens. above n 98. 277 
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Certainly groups are units capable of holding rights, but without some recognition of 
concomitant individual indigenous rights, significant numbers of indigenous peoples are 
excluded from present indigenous rights discourse. 
In New Zealand it is possible to see the heterogeneity of the Maori population that occurs 
as a result of colonisation, intermarriage and the gradual undermining of traditional group 
processes by non-Maori legislative procedures in areas such as land tenure. Many Maori 
groups other than hapu and iwi have great importance in terms of cultural identity, such as 
Urban Maori Authorities. New Zealand case law has had to respond to these changing 
circumstances and as a consequence, 'iwi' are now defined as broadly as possible, bearing 
little resemblance to traditional group formation processes. Many Maori see themselves 
now not as members of a group only, but also as cultural individuals, even if the prevailing 
rhetoric encourages us to envisage ourselves otherwise. Many thousands of Maori, 
including my own family have had to exercise individual choice to access and develop 
their indigenous identities. For many this will mean ultimate acceptance by a group from 
which we can receive cultural nourishment and protection. For others being part of a 
functioning group may remain an ideal that is never realised. 
How, then can such people on the edges of indigenous communities be included and 
protected by indigenous rights as contained in the DDRIP? An independent individual 
right to determine indigenous identity in Article 8 of the draft declaration can alongside the 
collective and individual right to indigenous group identity. The independent right may 
well be rarely invoked. It does, however, offer a way in to the other protections in the 
document. If indigenous individuals can exercise a right to determine their own identity 
without having a group to belong to, many will choose to return to, or learn to identify with 
indigenous groups. Thereby they will be able eventually to access the fuller protections of 
the draft given to groups. In this way more effective protection can be offered to those 
who, in many ways, are in the most need of it. 
Individual and collective rights to determine indigenous identity are bound to conflict. 
Indigenous identity is vulnerable to the whims of legislation, and scarcity of resources. An 
individual from the margins of a people claiming any indigenous identity is potentially a 
threat to the fragile resource and power base already in place. In the Canadian cases 
discussed in Part III, the Courts have intervened in some instances of such conflict and 
claimed a superior legal right to determine the membership of the bands in question. Such 
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cases have neatly avoided discussing the implications of the existence of a moral right to 
determine identity that is not dependent on treaty, legislation or a doctrine of legally 
recognised aboriginal rights. 
There is no easy solution to this rights conflict. There must be limitations placed on the 
rights to determine indigenous identity. Such tests cannot be predicated on McGuire's 
outdated notion of blood quantum, and even genealogy cannot be a failsafe determinant of 
indigenous identity. One possible way to resolve it might be for indigenous groups to 
recognise that in order to have the collective right to determine indigenous identity they 
must also carry out the duty to include, respect and protect all those who may be 
considered part of that indigenous identity. This is a duty on indigenous peoples not only 
to themselves as a group, but also to indigenous individuals. In recognising and carrying 
out that duty the potential for conflict may well lessen. Similarly any individual right to 
determine indigenous identity that can be exercised independently of a group identity must 
also be limited. Were it not, any person with such a whim could conceivably identify as 
indigenous, thereby placing indigenous resources at further risk. Ultimately identity 
cannot be determined in isolation, and an individual identifying as part of an indigenous 
group must be recognised by significant others of that group. Indigenous individuals 
claiming the right to be indigenous individuals under a revised Article 8 must also be 
recognised by significant others at least some of who also hold that indigenous identity, 
some of whom may not. The recognition itself is the test, not the criteria. The criteria for 
recognition must be determined by those indigenous significant others, those 'love 
relationships' mentioned by Charles Taylor. 
This paper suggests that the limitations placed on the amended Article 8 individual and 
collective rights to determine indigenous identity may be enough to help effectively 
resolve rights conflict when it occurs. Rather than look to other rights instruments and 
legislation that do not reflect indigenous experience, the Courts could look to an amended 
Article 8 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. They could apply 
appropriate limitations of such rights, including the test of recognition for determining who 
may and may not claim indigenous identity. For those of us attempting to claim the 
individual and group indigenous identities that could be allowed us by an amended 
DDRIP, the journey ever continues. 
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